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I

To set the nOlion of binary opposition in brief historical
perspective and to clarify the nature of the opposition
in question, we can recall Aristotle's specification of
four senses of the term "opposite":
1. one thing may be correlatively opposed to
something else, as the knower is to the known;
2. one thing may be the contrary of another, as odd
is to even, though intermediates between extremes
may obtain, as in the contraries "good" and "bad";
3. one term can signify a deficiency or privation in
reference to something naturally possessed, as
blindness in relation to sight;
4. statements may oppose one another by affmning
one thing true and its opposite false, as in "he is
human"/"he is nonhuman.'"

Although they have a long Western history, philosophical and otherwise, binary oppositions are not by
any means endemic to the Western world. They are
pan-cullural phenomena. The purpose of this paper,
however, is to examine a fundamental binary opposition
that, in its mode of expression in Western culture, is
endemic: the human/nonhuman opposition. Its
indigenous signature is readily apparent in the fact that
it subsumes other oppositions basic to Western ways of
thinking. Subsumed in its compass are the oppositions
nature/culture, mind/body, thinking/doing, reason/
emotion. Subsumed also are subsidiary oppositions,
ones having to do generally with behavior or behavioral
capability ascriptions such as learned/instinctual, future
planning/immediate action, articulate/mute, and the like.
Following a brief historical introduction, what the
examination will show first, in a quite summary way,
is how the subsumption works; what it will show second
is how the fundamental binary opposition is an ordering
principle of thought that is inconsistently applied and
that disregards a basic tenet of evolutionary theory; what
it will show third is how the categorical and uneven
opposition is evidentially unsound, myopically
self-serving, and for philosophers especially, a
particularly thin justification for cherishing their species.
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The particular kind of opposition of moment here is of
both the second and fourth kind: the second kind in
that the oppositional distinction sets up contrasting
conceptual categories with no intermediates, the fourth
kind in that the oppositional distinction in propositional
form affmns truth and falsity. Thus, one is either hwnan
or nonhuman; there are no in-betweens and a statement to one effect-"they are human" or "they are
nonhuman"---entails the falsity of its opposite. Similarly
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with the other oppositions. Here too there are no
in-betweens, and a statement affmning the one of any
pair is a denial of its opposite.
According to Western doctrine, humans are
distinguished by their culture, their minds, their
reasoning, and their thinking, nonhumans by the
conceptual antithesis of each of these categories. It is
not that humans do not have anything natural about
them, that they do not have bodies, that they do not
have capabilities to do as well as to think, that they do
not have emotions; it is that in the axiological scheme
of the four oppositions, these commonly conceived
possessions are of inestimably lesser significance and
value than their opposites. Indeed, they would not in
any preeminent sense be characterized as the natural
possessions of humans. Culture, mind, thinking, and
reasoning are the natural possessions of humans, just
as nature, body, doing, and emotion are the natural
possessions of nonhumans. The same axiological
scheme obtains in binary oppositions having to do with
behavioral ascriptions. It is humans who, in virtue of
their humanness, are capable of planning ahead, for
example; it is they who devise strategies for the future
and who do not live simply in the moment. In contrast,
it is nonhumans who are present-oriented, who grab
whatever is at hand, and who, "if something starts
hurting," as Dennett puts it, "'know enough' to
withdraw, but that is the best they can do."2 Not only
are the lines clearly drawn to begin with, but they are
clearly drawn successively along a considerable number
of binary oppositions following upon the first. In effect,
to be human is to occupy an invariably privileged, not
to say exalted, position in a world of otherwise merely
nonhuman creatures. In tum, a "hallowed gap"-to
borrow a phrase from Richard Dawkins-is forged in
the spectrum of animate life. 3

fact that although all humans are hominids, not all
hominids are human. Many of our direct hominid
ancestors, individuals belonging to the genus Homo,
made stone tools and/ or buried their dead. Not
belonging to either the species Homo sapiens or HOl1W
sapiens sapiens, however, they were nonhuman. How
are we to view them within the fundamental human/
nonhuman opposition? How can we possibly fit them
within one or the other category? Moreover, how do
we apportion them "mental credit" in terms of culture,
mind, thinking, and reasoning? If the answer is "On
the basis of behaviors attested to by fossil and artifactual
remains," the answer is defective. It is defective because
the categorical standards are inconsistently applied.
Culture, mind, thinking, and reasoning are commonly
honorific epithets reserved for humans and apportioned
in miserly fashion, if at all, outside a human circle. They
are thus not commonly awarded on the basis of such
specific nonhuman practices as termite fishing, the
Tanzsprache, hand-clasp-grooming, nest cleanliness,
bower-building, or the washing of sweet potatoes. 4 If
they are not awarded to chimpanzees who fashion sticks
for digging out termites, honeybees who kinetically
transcribe direction with respect to the sun into gravity
with respect to a hive, and so on, then on what grounds
should tlley be awarded to nonhuman hominid makers
of stone tools or to nonhuman hominids who buried
their dead? Simply on the grounds that we know what
species those creatures evolved into? If so, then it is
sheer favoritism that justifies the ascriptions, a
favoritism which, even if not sheer, hardly serves as a
valid justification. In particular, even if bolstered by
something like a sociobiological explanation that
declares the exclusivity of the epithets justified on the
basis of adaptation-<Jur genes lead us conceptually to
protect and privilege our own kind, hence to protect
and privilege those who passed on their genes in a
comparatively direct manner to us-the favoritism is
little more than a convenient sanctioning device, to be
applied whenever and wherever humans are called upon
to justify the morality of their interspecies behaviors.
Such selective affirmations and denigrations of
evolutionary relationships guarantee an ever-ready
ladder of evolutionary life with humans at the top.
"[T]he traditional summum bonum of bigger brains"5
dominates all from on high, even though, as Stephen
Jay Gould has pointed out, the world of living creatures
has been, is, and probably always will be, most properly
characterized as The Age of Bacteria. 6

II

Evolutionary theory is based on an abundance of
evidence showing historical continuities among
creatures all the way from species similarities-e.g.,
all hominids are consistently bipedal-to phylum
similarities-e.g., all creatures who have backbones
(fish, amphibians, reptiles, avians, mammals) belong
to the phylum "Chordata." Such continuities demand
careful attention with respect to the human/nonhuman
opposition, and this for two reasons in particular that
will be considered here. The first of these concerns the
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There is a further inconsistency in pointing to the
archaeological record to detennine how mental credit
should be apportioned, but an inconsistency of a quite
different kind insofar as the treasured epithets are
withheld from ascription to some hominids even while
they are awarded to others who lived both earlier and
later. Mental acuities thus appear, disappear, and then
reappear in the course of hominid evolution. In
particular, Neandertals are viewed by some paleoanthropologists as thoroughly nonhuman, that is, as
lacking the positively valorized natural intelligence of
hominids up to that point in time. Homo habilis, the
[lIst stone tool-making hominid species, for example,
and even earlier, Australopithecus afarensis, the first
bipedal hominid species, are both regularly lauded and
cherished by all paleoanthropologists as our ancestors
precisely on the grounds of their revolutionary new
practices, practices mentally credited in such estimable
ways as "being able to see to greater distances," "freeing
the hands for tool-making," "replacing teeth with
tools," and the like. We shall turn to the inconsistent
judgment of Neandertals in more detail after
considering the second reason for taking evolutionary
continuities seriously.
Evolutionary theory teaches that nothing de novo
arises in nature. Accordingly, culture, mind, thinking,
and reasoning did not suddenly arrive on the scene deus
ex mnchina; they evolved. Though Darwin's insistence
on the evolution of mental powers, thus on mental
continuities, goes virtually unacknowledged (and
virtually uncontested in any scholarly sense, whether
because of ignorance of his writings or neglect of the
pertinent sources), there is no doubt but that his notion
of evolution was wholistic: not merely physical bodies
evolved; intact creatures-"persistent wholes"evolved. 7 Hence Darwin's forthright concern with
mental powers-with attention, reasoning, memory,
curiosity, imitation, and so on, and their evolution.
Received Western wisdom that insists humans are
thoroughly unique in virtue of their cultures, their
minds, their thinking, and their reasoning insists on
discontinuities and feeds in some instances on peculiar
evolutionary ideas, indeed at times with the result that
humanness appears so special it exceeds the bounds of
a natural history. Thus in present-day philosophical
literature, we find the idea that humanness was a matter
of "one or two mutant nen'ous systems" having
"higher-order capacities" that "would have proliferated
like crazy."g Now of course there is no doubt that
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mutations exist in nature; but there is also no doubt that
they are usually detrimental if not lethal. As one
commonly used biology text points out, "This is not
surprising. If one were to change a word at random in a
Shakespearean sonnet or a wire at random in a television
set, an improvement would be unlikely, and the results
might well be disastrous."9 Of the types of mutation
known, moreover, additions (and deletions) are the most
harmful. 10 Taken seriously nonetheless, the idea that
human minds were produced by "a few mutations...
that would enhance... reproductive fitness"U severs at
a stroke any ties that might bind humans and their
culture, minds, thinking, or reasoning to other creatures;
it cuts humans off from the rest of the animate world.
In short, "higher-order capacities" are not viewed as
having any substantive evolutionary Le., historical,
relationship to (whatever might be said to constitute)
"lower-order capacities. " Higher-order capacities owe
their existence not to evolution-to descent with
modifi,cation 12-but to "one or two mutant nervous
systems." With these one or two mutant systems, a
Rubicon is crossed, and lo! what is essentially nonhuman becomes essentially human.
III
For the past years, a controversy has been growing as to
how modern-day humans are related to Neandertals. Did
they replace Neandertals, or are Neandertals the direct
ancestor of humans of European and Western Asian
descent? In other words, did modern humans arise "out
of Africa" and in time spread from there allover the
world, overcoming Neandertals in the process, or did
they evolve multi-regionall y from the stock of hominids
already existing multi-regionally, hominids such as
Neandertals in Europe and Western Asia? The interest in
the question for a philosopher lies not in helping
paleoanthropologists sort out their thinking on the
matter,13 though in one area some clarification-not of
necessity demanding the skills of a philosopher-is
certainly required. 14 The interest lies rather in the
opportunity to inform oneself of two major and obviously
related liabilities in making evolutionary claims: an
evolutionarily unenlightened predilection for taking the
human/ nonhuman opposition to be categorically
absolute; and a predilection for evolutionarily untenable
mind-pops-suddenly-into-place scenarios. Each of these
liabilities can be succinctly illustrated by considering
one well-known stand on the controversy.
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When British paleoanthropologist Christopher
Stringer and archaeologist Clive Gamble argue for the
replacement theory-early modern humans supplanted
Neandertals with no interbreeding-they do so in
terms of there being a sudden onset of "symbolic
behaviour," a "flick of the switch."15 Prior to the flick,
there was no symbolic behavior but only the mindless
repetition of behavioral forms. "The Ancients"
(Neandertals) are thus distinguished from "the
Moderns" (Homo sapiens) by their lack of culture,
mind, thinking, and reasoning. While the distinction
might seem to vindicate the existence of a Rubicon
since it is offered by evolutionary scientists, it does
not. Stringer and Gamble are precisely unaware of
symbolic behavior documented in primate species
other than humans, let alone aware of any unresolved
debate about whether the Tanzsprache is a form of
symbolic behavior or of the idea that corporeal
representation is a biological matrix. 16 Their judgment
about Neandertals' lack of "symbolic behaviour" is
summed up in their statement concerning a "capacity
for emulation, for change, but not for symbolism."
They say ftrst that, "while they [Neandertals] could
emulate they could not fully understand," and then
immediately add that "We suspect, for example, that
the structures at Molodova and Arcy-sur-Cure more
resembled 'nests' than the symbolic 'homes' of the
Moderns at Kostenki or Dolni Vestonice."17 Their
derisive, clearly nonhuman judgment of Neandertal
dwellings (and tools) more or less matches their
derisive, nonhuman judgment of Neandertallanguage. 18

typical for the one group of chimpanzees is totally
absent in the other group. After examining possible
explanations on the grounds of different environmental
selection pressures-parasite infestation, for exampleand after detailed further investigations with respect to
criteria for culture, he states:
Suppose that the grooming-hand-clasp had
been described by someone like E. T. Hall for
a human society in East Africa. Suppose that
he presented ethnographic data exactly as here,
contrasting the gestural repertoires of two
neighboring cultures. It would be accorded
cultural status without questioning, and would
dutifully be coded into the Human Relations
Area File [an ongoing, world-wide research
index of every human behavior, belief,
practice, ritual, etc. recorded and studied by
anthropologists] to be used in future crosscultural analyses. Where does this leave the
chimpanzees of Kasoje and Kanyawara [the
only other group of chimpanzees observed to
practice hand-clasp grooming, but not studied
longitudinally] ?20
Mind: Kanzi is a chimpanzee who comprehends
spoken English at the level of a 2 1/2 year old human
child. 21 He learned English spontaneously when, for
the ftrst two-and-a-half years of his life, he observed
experimenters attempting to teach English to his mother,
who was unable to comprehend the symbols used to
teach the language. His comprehension is of particular
interest in light of more than 40 years of research on
human speech perception which shows it to be
dependent upon speech production. 22 The linkage is
causatively explained in terms of "an analogue of the
production process-an internal, innately specifted
vocal-tract synthesizer... that incorporates complete
information about the anatomical and physiological
characteristics of the vocal tract and also about the
articulatory and acoustic consequences of linguistically
significant gestures."23 In short, a "language module"
in the brain decodes the speaker's speech and in fact
distinguishes linguistically signiftcant gestures from
non-linguistic ones. Clearly, Kanzi does not have "an
internal, innately specified vocal-tract synthesizer...
that incorporates complete information about the
anatomical and physiological characteristic of the vocal
tract" since not only does he not have a human brain,

In brief, whatever the Neandertals did, it lacked any
sign of the "mental essence"19 that is the ne plus ultra
of humanness.
To chart an absolute divide between humans and
nonhumans as Stringer and Gamble do is evidentially
unsound both because it afftrms a Rubicon and thus
denies evolutionary continuities and because, as noted
above, it ignores evidence of culture, mind, thinking,
and reasoning in nonhuman animals. This evidence may
be summarized as follows:
Culture: Primatologist W. C. McGrew addresses the
question critically and in detail of whether chimpanzees
have culture. He uses grooming behavior as a model,
consulting two longitudinally studied East African
chimpanzee groups (living in Kasoje and Gombe,
respectively) that are genetically undifferentiated from
each other. He points out that the particular and unusual
style of grooming-the grooming-hand-clasp---that is
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enough, Darwin points out that "Few persons any longer
dispute that animals possess some power of reasoning"
and notes by way of example that "Animals may
constantly be seen to pause, deliberate, and resolve."
He then makes the thought-provoking observation that
"It is a significant fact, that the more the habits of any
particular animal are studied by a naturalist, the more
he attributes to reason and the less to unlearnt
instincts."32 (We might recall in this context that
Lamarck is judged to have failed to arrive at the
principle of natural selection precisely because, rather
than being in the field, in the woods, or at the shore, he
was a philosophe du cabinet.)33
At least two major implications for philosophers
follow from the above examples. First, thinking is not
tied exclusively to language. Nonlinguistic forms of
thinking thus demand acknowledgment and attentive
study. Second, nonhuman animals are represented on
each side of each of the oppositional divides-and so,
of course, correlatively, are we humans. Thus not only
are the divides suspect to begin with, but the axiological
schemes that inform them are equally so.
In sum, the fundamental binary opposition that
categorically separates humans and nonhumans and
that progressively orders much of Western human
thought is countermanded by the evidence. A hard and
fast division, however much believed in or yearned
for, flies in the face of historical facts which support
evolutionary continuities, and in the face of nonhuman
animal research studies that support the same
continuities. It even appears to fly in the face of
everyday Western practices and transactions,
especially those having to do with humans' exploitatively grabbing whatever is at hand and not
adequately devising strategies for the future. Indeed,
perhaps "that is the best they can do."

he does not have a human body, Le., a human anatomy
and physiology. The question of how it is he learned to
comprehend normal English sentences on the order of
"Get your ball" or even "Put the lemon in the water" and
quite outlandish sentences on the order of"Can you throw
a potato at the turtle?,,24 must thus look to quite other
understandings ofhis abilities. For those understandings
to be consistent with standard understandings, one must
of course take into account that by common everyday
human standards, whoever comprehends a verbal
language is ipso facto accorded a mind.
Thinking: 25 Zoologist's Bernd Heinrich's experimental study of ravens shows them capable of solving
a complicated food procurement problem, thus, as
would typically be said of humans, capable of thinking.
The ravens determined how a piece of meat that was
attached to a twenty-five inch long string attached to
their perch could be secured. As Heinrich observes, "to
obtain the meat a bird would have to land on the perch
above it, reach down with its bill, pull up a loop of
string, step onto the string to anchor it, release the bill,
reach down again to pull up another loop, and so on, in
a repeating cycle of more than twenty steps until the
meat was raised to the perch."26 What Heinrich found
was that after approximately six hours, without any trial

and error attempts. but with repeated glances at the
meat "as though studying the situation,"27 the ravens
secured the meat. Heinrich's conclusion: ravens are
intelligent and capable of insight.
Reasoning: Sextus Empiricus cites Chrysippus's
account of a dog that, "arriving at a spot where three
ways meet, after smelling at the two roads by which
the quarry did not pass,... rushes off at once by the
third without stopping to smell."28 This same kind of
"implicit reasoning"29 is twice described by Darwin,
once with respect to a retriever who could not carry
back two birds at the same time, so killed one, took the
frrst back, then returned for the second dead one. 3D In
the course of giving concrete examples of reasoning
in nonhuman animals, Darwin cites the aphorism of
South American muleteers to the effect that'" I will
not give you the mule whose step is easiest, but la mas
racional-the one that reasons best.'" Interestingly
enough, he goes on immediately to cite A. von
Humboldt's comment on the muleteers' aphorism:
'" [T]his popular expression, dictated by long
experience, combats the system ofanimated machines,
better perhaps than all the arguments of speculative
philosophy'" (italics added).3! Again, interestingly
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I might note that a reviewer of this paper commented as
follows: "Is it a fact thatN's (sic) had language? What counts
as lang. is itself very controversial." To my mind, what counts
as language appears to depend upon who is doing the counting.
Thus, the question, who is doing the counting? is as
controversial as the question, what counts as language?
19 The idea of there being a "mental essence" with respect
to humanness comes (surprisingly) from Stephen Jay Gould
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4. Thinking about a problem, I suddenly find an answerwithout reasoning.
5. When asked to give reasons for my behavior, I think
about what motivates my behavior.
6. When reasoning with respect to developing an
argument, I think about various facets of the issue.

20 W. C. McGrew, Chimpanzee Material Culture:
Implications for Human Evolution (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1992), p. 87. I should note that McGrew
also points out that "Abundant examples now exist of the
social transmission of acquired behaviour in groups of
non-human animals" and that "objections in the earlier
literature to biased anthropocentrism or simple reliance on
anecdotes need no longer apply" (p. 72). I would like to point
out too in response to a reviewer's concern-"Would help to
say what you take culture to be"-that McGrew defines
culture in very exacting terms according to eight specific
criteria that allow "recognizing cultural acts in other species"
(Ibid., p. 77). Finally, I might quote McGrew's comment
concerning the reticence of anthropologists to acknowledge
the evidence for culture in nonhuman animals-since the same
reticence might well be found among philosophers. McGrew
writes that "The overall impression is that until recently
anthropologists either long ignored the evidence for nonhuman
culture, erected ad hominem criteria which avoided taking the
phenomenon seriously or, haVing considered the problem felt
it necessary to move the goal-posts" (Ibid., p. 73).

26 Bernd Heinrich, "A Birdbrain Nevermore," Natural
History 102110 (October 1993): 51-56, pp. 53-54.
27

28 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines ofPyrrhonism, trans. R. G.
Bury (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1990), p. 36. In more
detailed explanation, Sextus writes that the dog (according to
Chrysippus) "makes use of the fifth complex indemonstrable
syllogism... [fjor, says the old writer [Chrysippus], the dog
implicitly reasons thus: 'The creature went either by this road
or by that, or by the other: but it did not go by this road or by
that: therefore it went by the other'" (Ibid.).

29 See

note 9.

30 Charles Darwin, The Descent ofMan, p. 48. (The second
example is also given on p. 48.)

Kanzi was born (1980) and reared at the Georgia State
University Language Research Center.
21

31

Ibid.

32

Ibid., p. 46.

33 See Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, "Why Lamarck Did Not
Discover the Principle of Natural Selection," Journal of the
History ofBiology 15/3 (Fall 1982): 443-465.

22 See Alvin M. Liberman and Ignatius G. Mattingly, "The
Motor Theory of Speech Perception Revised," Cognition 21
(1985): 1-36.
23

Ibid., p. 55.

Ibid., p. 26.

24 See Sue Savage-Rumbaugh and Roger Lewin, Kanzi
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1994), 169-170; and Bonobo
People, Georgia State University Language Research Center
video (footage by NHK of Japan). See also E. Sue SavageRumbaugh, Jeannine Murphy, Rose A. Sevcik, Karen E.
Brakke, Shelly L. Williams, Duane M. Rumbaugh, Language
Comprehension in Ape and Child (Monographs ofthe Society
for Research in Child Development 58/3-4 [1993]) (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1993).
25 A reviewer of this paper commented, "Wouldn't hurt
to say what you mean by thinking" and further, wondered
with respect to thinking and reasoning, "How are these
different?" I would answer generally that one can think
without reasoning but one cannot reason without thinking. I
would give as examples the following:
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